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ABSTRACT 
 
MICHAEL UCHRIN: Civic Virtue in a Christian Mind:  Charles Rollin and the 
Jansenist Influence on the Revival of Classical Virtue in France 
(Under the Direction of Jay M. Smith) 
 
 
The French Revolution, like much else in the eighteenth century, was undeniably 
influenced by a revival of classical Greco-Roman themes, particularly in the realm of 
politics.  Unfortunately, classical civic virtue in the French context has generally been 
viewed as a largely secular affair.  In fact, the turn toward classical republican thought 
was also markedly influenced by the Augustinian theological beliefs of the Jansenists, an 
austere group of Catholics.  One of their number, Charles Rollin, a prominent educator 
and author, played an important role in revising French education, placing a great deal of 
emphasis on the instruction of virtue.  This thesis will demonstrate the connections 
between the religious tenets of the Jansenists and the classical republican civic virtue that 
Rollin prescribes as a remedy not for the individual soul, but for the political and social 
health of the patrie.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The French Revolution has drawn the attention of academics and historians 
almost from the time of the Revolution itself.  This is entirely understandable, 
considering the monumental forces that the Revolution unleashed throughout Europe and 
beyond.  However, as a result of the Revolution’s undeniable importance, historians of 
the eighteenth century often view the rest of the century as mere prelude to the 
Revolution itself, and the vision of the century’s events, ideas and dynamics become 
clouded by the anticipation of the coming Revolution.  Roger Chartier warns against this 
danger in historiography, for the result is “a reading of the eighteenth century that seeks 
to understand it only in relation to its necessary outcome—the French Revolution—and 
to focus only on the phenomenon seen to lead to this outcome—the Enlightenment.”1  In 
writing these words, Chartier was warning specifically against placing too strong an 
emphasis on the Intellectual “origins” of the French Revolution, but the danger of 
attributing perceived causes to “necessary” outcomes applies equally to all historical 
pursuits.  One excellent example of this sort of teleological thinking involves the revival 
of classical republican concepts of virtue in the early eighteenth century. 
                                                 
1
 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, tr. Lydia Cochrane, (Durham: The Duke 
University Press, 1991), 5. 
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Too frequently, historians interpret the development of classical virtue during this 
period as purely secular in nature.2  This conclusion, though erroneous, is understandable 
in light of the Revolution’s tendency to draw the attention of historians.  It is true that 
classical conceptions of virtue reached their apogee during the Revolution in a highly 
secularized, and often anti-religious, form.  However, the fact that conceptions of civic 
virtue came to be secularized does not indicate secular origins.  As this essay will 
demonstrate, the development of conceptions of civic virtue in France depended largely 
upon Augustinian theological conceptions held predominantly among a group of devout 
Catholics known as Jansenists.  These theological conceptions involved the utter 
separation of God and man, the stark juxtaposition of a perfect God and irredeemably 
corrupt humankind, and the utter incapacity of man to act out of virtue save through the 
“efficacious” or transformative Grace of God.  These pessimistic conceptions of man’s 
utter corruption were significant, as Nannerl Keohane describes in great detail, for the 
efforts of several notable Jansenists, such as Blaise Pascal and Pierre Nicole, to reconcile 
man’s utter concupiscence with the reality of human social life influenced several great 
works of political thought, including those of John Locke.3  Furthermore, these Jansenist 
thinkers also influenced the Jansenist and educator Charles Rollin, whose pedagogical 
                                                 
2
 There are several excellent works on the revival of classical republican thought and classical conceptions 
of virtue, most notably: Marisa Linton, The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France (Hampshire and 
New York: Palgrave, 2001); Keith Michael Baker, “Transformations of Classical Republicanism in 
Eighteenth-Century France,” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 73, no. 1, 35; and Johnson Kent Wright, 
A Classical Republican in Eighteenth Century France: The Political Thought of Mably, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1997).  Each of these works deals almost solely with political ideas of virtue, 
with Linton in particular drawing stark distinctions between “Christian” virtue and classical republican 
civic virtue. 
 
3
 Locke was very much interested in the ideas of the Jansenists of Port Royal.  In fact, my first exposure to 
the works of Pierre Nicole were from translations of “several men of Port Royal” translated by Locke 
entitled Discourses on the being of a God and the immortality of the soul; of the weakness of man; and 
concerning the way of preserving peace with men: being some of the essays written in French by Messieurs 
du Port Royal. Render'd into English by the late John Lock, (London: J. Downing, 1712). 
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treatises combined these theological conceptions with aspects of classical republican 
conceptions of virtue and the patrie in a synthesis that Rollin hoped could revitalize 
France. 
Unlike many historians of the eighteenth century, David Bell recognizes these 
connections between Augustinian beliefs and classical republican conceptions of virtue.  
In The Cult of the Nation in France, Bell clearly demonstrates the religious influences on 
concepts such as the patrie, as well as the Augustinian roots of the utter separateness of 
the divine and the human.  According to Bell, it was only when the “French ceased to see 
themselves as part of a great hierarchy uniting heaven and earth, the two linked by an 
apostolic church and a divinely ordained king, that they could start to see themselves as 
equal members of a distinct, uniform, and sovereign nation.”4  In his view, the revival of 
concepts such as devotion to the patrie and the practice of civic virtue in the classical 
sense—the bases of what Bell refers to as Nationalism—“arose simultaneously out of, 
and in opposition to, Christian systems of belief.”5 
The problem with Bell’s notions is that the perception of “a radical separation 
between God and the world” and the love of one’s patrie as an alternative focus of 
devotion does not equate to “opposition to Christian systems of belief.”6  Though Bell 
recognizes that the notion of the separation of God and man developed as a consequence 
of Augustinian theological conceptions—that God alone was sacred and that mankind 
was utterly corrupt—he tends to conflate the separation of the earthly and the divine with 
                                                 
4
 David A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800, (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 8. 
 
5
 Ibid., 7. 
 
6
 Ibid., 7. 
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the rejection of the latter.  It is here that the magnetic effect of the Revolution is most 
apparent in Bell’s work.  The rejection of the Church hierarchy and the de-sanctification 
of the “divinely ordained” king certainly proved a departure from the medieval 
conceptions of the world, but they do not equate to an opposition to religion or to 
Christian beliefs as a whole.  In fact, many of the ideas that Bell cites in secularized form, 
especially the thoughts of Rousseau, had already been formulated and expressed by 
Charles Rollin in his Traité des études while Rousseau was still a child. 
One of the earliest proponents of classical republican conceptions of civic virtue 
in France, Charles Rollin was a devoutly religious Jansenist, historian and educator, 
whose pedagogical and historical writings influenced people throughout Europe and even 
across the Atlantic.  The son of a cutler, Rollin had risen to the esteemed position of 
rector at the University of Paris, a position he would lose in 1712 due to his adherence to 
the Jansenist faith.7  In fact, apart from his fondness for the virtues of the ancient 
republics, Rollin’s greatest influence was certainly his devotion to God, as religious 
ideals permeated his works.  The way in which Rollin connected his religious beliefs to 
his reflections on republican political precepts reveals glimmering new facets of 
eighteenth-century political thought. 
Jansenists and Jansenism played an important role both in the religious and the 
political history of France.  Several historians have written seminal works on Jansenism 
in recent years, especially in terms of the political consequences of both the nature of 
their beliefs and their mere existence as an impediment to total religious conformity in 
                                                 
7
 Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century France, (Ithaca and 
London: The Cornell University Press, 2005), 50. 
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the Bourbon Monarchy.8  Though Dale Van Kley, David Bell, and others have focused 
most of their attention on the role of the Jansenists in the legal profession and in the Paris 
Parlements, this essay will look more deeply at the theological concepts of Jansenism and 
the social implications of their beliefs. 
Unlike the dominant modes of Catholic thought in previous centuries, and 
especially the Molinist tradition of the Jesuits, the Augustinian thoughts embraced by the 
Jansenists emphasized the starkest separation between God and man.  God’s “elect,” 
those chosen by God to receive the gifts of Grace, were the only men capable of any 
virtuous action at all.  The utter dissimilarity between “God’s infinite goodness and the 
corrupt, concupiscent state of humanity” created a vast gulf insurmountable by man.9  
According to Van Kley, the immediate social and political consequence of Jansenism lay 
in its tendency “to de-sanctify everything between conscience and God, to limit divinity 
to God alone”10  This separation and de-sanctification of all things human helped create 
an impression of a “hidden God” that actually could serve as a liberating force, according 
to Bell, one that offered men a certain autonomy to define their own terms of 
conception.11  This point is an excellent one, however, the fact is that the earliest attempts 
at redefining these terms of conception were deeply religious in nature, and it was out of 
                                                 
8
 See Dale Van Kley,  The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil 
Constitution, 1560-1791, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996); and The Jansenists and 
the Expulsion of the Jesuits from France, 1757-1765, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1975).  Also David A. Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France, 
(New York and Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 1994).  All three of these works focus primarily on 
the political implications of the Jansenist movement in the eighteenth century. 
 
9
 Bell, Cult of the Nation in France, 28. 
 
10
 Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution, 63. 
 
11
 Bell, Cult of the Nation in France, 28. 
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his dissatisfaction with the pessimistic implications of these conceptions that Rollin 
reexamined the civic virtue of the ancients. 
One significant development that arose from some of the earliest Jansenist 
thinkers, such as Blaise Pascal, involved a dilemma that I refer to here as the 
“Augustinian trap.”  The idea that God and man are so entirely different from one 
another, and that man apart from God is irredeemably corrupt, led to the belief that the 
bulk of humanity were incapable of any virtuous action.  This bleak view of human 
society formed the basis of several social conceptions designed to address the viability of 
man’s social interactions in a concupiscent state.  These religious social conceptions, as 
well as Rollin’s deep dissatisfaction with the selfishness and corruption he saw 
throughout French society, pushed him toward a renewed emphasis on ancient examples 
of virtuous life in the education of France’s youth.  
William Gribbin has characterized Rollin as an iconoclastic figure, a “desperate 
teacher” attempting to “forge a new order of things by molding impressionable readers 
into Christian rebels against their times.”12  This assessment makes a great deal of sense, 
especially considering the state of France during Rollin’s lifetime.  In addition to the 
general laxity of morals that Rollin derided, the reign of Louis XIV created many 
problems both for France and for Rollin personally.  Costly wars and the king’s pursuit of 
foreign glory left the nation exhausted and weary—in fact Louis’ wars were among the 
few recent events Rollin actually discussed in his works.13  The overall extravagance of 
the Sun King’s reign, including the opulence and expense of Versailles, the creation of 
                                                 
12
 William Gribbin, “Rollin’s Histories and American Republicanism,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
3d series, vol. 29, no. 4 (Oct., 1972), 616. 
 
13
 Charles Rollin, Traité des études, 3 vols. (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1863), 2:179. 
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numerous crown officials, and especially the practice of selling titles of nobility also 
likely struck Rollin as corrupt, wasteful, and a perversion of the very concept of 
“nobility” as Rollin understood the term.14  Furthermore, the repeated persecution of 
Jansenists, which culminated in the Unigenitus bull of 1713, had already cost Rollin his 
position as head of the University of Paris.15 
For his time, Rollin’s ideals were remarkably egalitarian in their tone, and these 
ideas influenced a number of important social, political, and pedagogical trends that 
flourished in the latter half of the century.  Furthermore, his ideals all resonated with the 
religious principles held by this devoutly Christian educator, whose devotion to God did 
not compromise, in fact contributed to, his devotion to his patrie and its youth. 
I believe that an understanding of the hidden interconnection between politics and 
religion is pertinent and significant, especially as our world shrinks and we find ourselves 
further enmeshed with cultures that have not gone to the great lengths we have to 
compartmentalize the two.  As we attempt to craft nations in which religious forces are 
very prominent, we should not neglect the religious derivations of our own political and 
social ideals.  Furthermore, lest we run the risk of considering the ideas of Jansenist 
thinkers like Rollin as “archaic” and “foreign,” we must consider the very cosmopolitan 
character of the age referred to as the Enlightenment.  For example, my first experiences 
with the works of Pierre Nicole came in the form of Locke’s translations of “various men 
of St. Cyran.”  Locke, who held such great influence on the English (and therefore “our”) 
                                                 
14
 According to Alexis de Tocqueville, 40,000 new official posts were created from 1693 to 1709 alone, 
and de Tocqueville notes that as the actual power of the nobility dwindled, their jealousy over their 
remaining privileges only increased, yet another indication of the self-interest that Rollin held in the 
strongest contempt.  See Alexis De Tocqueville, L’Ancien régime et la Révolution, ed. J.-P Mayer, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1967), 165-6, 171. 
 
15
 Smith, Nobility Reimagined, 50; Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution, 73. 
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political thought, was a great admirer of Jansenist ideas.  Furthermore, as William 
Gribbin points out, Rollin himself had a great influence on the ideals of early Americans, 
most notably Benjamin Franklin and John Adams and his family.16  Let us not forget that 
many of the founding fathers of our own nation were as devout in their religious beliefs 
as Rollin was in his.
                                                 
16
 Gribbin, 612-13. 
  
 
CHAPTER II 
JANSENISM AND ITS PRINCIPLES 
 
Since Jansenism and Jansenist theological terms form the context in which Rollin 
thought, and since his religious convictions informed everything he wrote, it is important 
first to examine Jansenism and its basic tenets.  The label Jansenist or Jansenism 
developed several distinct connotations throughout the final two centuries of Old Regime 
France.  Jansenism began as a spiritual and religious movement within the Catholic 
Church; but through time and repeated suppression by both popes and kings, Jansenists 
and their sympathizers took on a more political aspect, particularly within the Parlements 
and the Paris Parlement especially.  The direct political controversies that developed 
between the monarchy and the Jansenists have been discussed in great detail in other 
works, and also are of little consequence for the subject at hand, therefore no detailed 
account of these political machinations will be found here.17  Of course, the Unigenitus 
bull and the suppression of Jansenism influenced Rollin’s political attitudes, including his 
understanding of despotism; however, the important aspect of Jansenism in this study is 
the central position that Augustinian conceptions of concupiscence and grace held within 
                                                 
17
 See Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution; Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of 
the French Revolution.  Both of these works address the implications of the Jansenits’ rejection of the 
Church hierarchy and the implicit threat that this posed to all social hierarchies of the French state.  In 
addition, the unbridgeable gap between God and man also implied a “desacralization” of the French 
Monarchy, which both authors credit partially for the vast alterations of social and political outlook in the 
eighteenth century.    
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the Jansenist theology itself.  For these conceptions formed the bases for the social 
dilemma that strict Augustinian doctrine created, and also influenced Rollin’s thoughts on 
the benefits of civic virtue. 
The most authoritative accounts of  Jansenist belief at the dawn of the eighteenth 
century can be found in Pasquier Quesnel’s Moral Reflections on the New Testament (Le 
nouveau testament en française, avec des réflexions morales sur chaque verset), the first 
finished edition of which was published in 1693.  As its original title implies, the work 
was an entire translation of the New Testament, combined with Quesnel’s commentaries, 
or reflections, on every verse.  The finished product consisted of four volumes, though 
the reflections on the Gospels were published in 1672 under the title Abrégé de la morale 
de l’évangile.  Quesnel’s Moral Reflections were the most complete, most authoritative 
exposition of Jansenist theology at the dawn of the eighteenth century, and not 
coincidentally, the target of many attacks by the Catholic orthodoxy, including the papal 
bull Unigenitus, issued in 1713. 
 Within the pages of the Moral Reflections, one can find the scriptural basis of the 
many tenets of Jansenist belief.  Among the distinctive traits of the faith were the 
predestination of God’s elect; the need for “efficacious,” or transformative, grace; and the 
notion of a “community of saints” that existed separately from the official hierarchy of 
the Catholic Church.  None of these tenets are in any way unique to Jansenism, as they 
also formed the bulk of the Calvinist faith, but the combination of these particular beliefs 
certainly represented a departure from traditional Catholic orthodoxy—though the 
Jansenists remained within the Catholic Church. 
11 
 
 First of all, Quesnel’s reflections on grace and the “elect” (les élus) demonstrate 
both the scriptural derivations and general idea behind the concept of election.  In his 
commentary on Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, Quesnel notes that: 
we are not made Christians to enjoy tangible goods, but those goods that 
can only be known by faith… the entire economy of the mysteries of 
salvation are for the elect—God prepares his glory for those who love 
Him; but those that do only love Him because He had prepared them for 
this love, so that all is due to God and all of the glory is His.18 
 
Therefore, the love of God is a choice—but not a choice made by the believer but by God 
Himself.  God confers His grace to those who love Him, but He determines in advance 
who will be capable of this love and prepares them to receive it.  This is nearly precisely 
the same derivation and understanding of predestination claimed by John Calvin and 
others—that God ordains, or rather has ordained from the dawn of time, who shall 
receive salvation.  Therefore, only those humans whom God has chosen can receive his 
love, grace, and blessings. 
In his reflections on Peter’s first Epistle, Quesnel described the role of the Holy 
Trinity and their effects upon the elect of God: 
The three divine personages work together for the salvation of the elect.  
The Father is the origin of their election through His eternal prescience 
and His entirely free gift of love; the Son serves as the sacrifice for their 
sins and the source of all their merits; the Holy Spirit is the spirit of Holy 
adoption and love, who gives them their new birth, animates them, 
sanctifies them, directs their actions, and guides them to glory.19 
 
This passage again underscores the notion of election by God, but also adds the idea that 
God through Christ is the source of all of human merit and that the Holy Spirit provides 
                                                 
18
 Pasquier Quesnel, Le Nouveau Testament en français, avec des réflexions morales sur chaque verset, 
pour en rendre la Lecture plus utile, & la Méditation plus aisée, 4 vols. (Paris: Chez André Pralard, 1699), 
3:519. 
 
19
 Quesnel, 4:461-2. 
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the transformative rebirth, which guides the actions of the chosen.  Without the Grace of 
God, through the actions of the Trinity, there is no merit, no virtue, among men. 
This concept of the “elect” is of utmost importance to understand Jansenist 
beliefs.  It is the point where Jansenism most closely resembled the Calvinist “heresy,” 
and among the most crucial concepts in the development of Jansenist social thought.  
Coupled with the belief in “efficacious” or transformative Grace, the concept of election 
by God created a fundamental dilemma for society.  This dilemma was further 
complicated by the idea that not even the elect themselves can know who has been 
chosen by God.  Neither the Church nor any group within the Church “can flatter itself 
that it consists entirely of the elect.  All is mixed:  therefore all have cause to fear, and all 
have cause to hope.”20 
 In addition to the tenet of predestination, Jansenist beliefs were also informed by 
the belief in the utter concupiscence of man.  This theme is of utmost importance in the 
Augustinian view of mankind, and a central theme of Jansenist thought.  Apart from God, 
man was guided solely by his lusts and his passions.  In fact, Cornelius Jansen’s 
Discourse on the Reformation of the Inner Man began with the words of St. Johns First 
Epistle:  “There is nothing in this world but concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of 
the eyes, and the pride of life.”21  This combination of ideas—the utter concupiscence of 
man, the absolute need for efficacious grace for man to be virtuous, and the concept of 
divine election—leave little room for the bulk of humanity to act out of any interest 
except for pure self-interest.  I refer to this situation as the “Augustinian trap,” for in this 
                                                 
20
 Quesnel, 1:369. 
 
21
 Cornelius Jansenius, Traduction d’un discours de la reformation de l’homme interieur : ou sont establis 
les veritables fondemens des vertus chrestiennes, (Paris : Vve J. Camusat, 1642), 3. 
13 
 
system of belief, man is trapped in a course that appears to be designed for catastrophe.  
If each member of society is capable of nothing more than looking after his own interests, 
there can be little cause for optimism regarding society or the human condition.  Based on 
these premises, some Jansenist thinkers sought ways of explaining the workings of 
society and possible means by which peace, stability, and order could be maintained in an 
utterly corrupt world.  The following pages will examine the thoughts and writings of two 
of these men, Blaise Pascal and Pierre Nicole, whose works focused on the unbridled 
self-love (amour-propre) inherent in all men.  Rollin would later dismiss many of their 
conceptions, but it was their efforts to examine social function from an Augustinian 
perspective that set the stage for Rollin’s reexamination of classical virtue.
  
 
CHAPTER III 
PASCAL AND NICOLE 
 
The preceding passages, which represent several fundamental principles of 
Jansenist belief, indicate the fundamental dilemma of not only Jansenist thought, but of 
Augustinian thought in general: if Grace is the sole source of all merit and virtuous 
actions; and Grace is only granted to a small, select number of people preordained by 
God to receive it; and if even the elect themselves did not know that they were so, how 
can the right function of societies be understood and preserved?  In other words, how 
does a society composed largely of utterly corrupt humans avoid destroying itself through 
the absolute corruption and selfishness of the vast majority of its members?  If self-
interest and self-love were the sole motivators of the bulk of humanity, there seemed to 
be little hope for men to live decently and in harmony with one another.  The Molinist 
tradition of the Jesuits, as well as other adherents to the notion of “sufficient grace,” 
avoided this problem through the belief that Grace was available to all and could be 
applied to specific situations and specific moments.  But in the strict Augustinian view of 
the Jansenists and Calvinists, this problem could not be avoided.  Because of the 
intractability of the Augustinian trap as it appeared in Jansenism, many Jansenist writers 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attempted to resolve this dilemma by 
postulating the means by which amour-propre could be limited or ameliorated.  One such 
15 
 
notable philosophical figure was the Jansenist mathematician and theologian Blaise 
Pascal. 
Pascal, the famed mathematician who retired from numbers to pursue the Godly 
life, wrote a great number of passages devoted to Augustinian theological ideals and 
especially the depraved state of man.  His Provincial Letters as well as his Pensées reveal 
a markedly pessimistic view of the nature of man and his capacity for goodness.  These 
ideas on the concupiscent nature of man were all compatible with the Augustinian 
notions proposed by Jansen, St. Cyran, and Quesnel.  However, Pascal, mathematician 
and scientist at heart that he was, spent a great deal of his time attempting to work out the 
concrete social and political consequences of this concupiscence. 
For Pascal, all of man’s actions were firmly rooted in the cause of amour-propre 
and self-interest.  The only possible outlet for human love outside of the self was God 
and only through God could man receive the charité that follows from His grace: 
Since we cannot love that which is outside ourselves, we must try to love a 
being which will be in us and yet not us, and this is true of each and every 
man.  Only the universal Being can be such.  The kingdom of God is in us:  
the universal good is in us, is us, and yet is not us.22 
 
This passage makes quite clear the distinction that man can only love the self or the God 
within the self.  There are no other options here than the narrow focus of amour-propre, 
or the love of God from whom all virtues follow. 
There were only two types of people in Pascal’s world: “the righteous who 
believe themselves sinners… and sinners who believe themselves righteous.”23  In fact, 
Pascal declares that lust and force are “the source of all our actions; lust causes voluntary 
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 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (d’après l’édition de M. Brunschvigg), ed. Emile Boutroux, (Paris : J. M. Dent et 
Fils, 1913), 203. 
 
23
 Ibid., 217. 
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actions, force involuntary ones.24  Thus men are compelled either by their basest 
inclinations or by the force of others.  Even seemingly virtuous behavior is simply vice in 
disguise; through vice, “men have found and extracted excellent rules of policy, morality, 
and justice; but in reality this vile root of man, this figmentum malum, is only covered, it 
is not taken away.”25  These constructions of man are of no true value whatever in terms 
of goodness and truly “good” living.  Only in Christ is found “all our virtue and all our 
happiness… apart from Him there is but vice, misery, darkness, death, despair.26  
Since this propensity for self-interest was utterly unavoidable, save through grace, 
and since grace could be obtained only by those whom God has chosen, some regulatory 
device was required to limit the obvious negative aspects of this self-interest.  For Pascal, 
in the absence of real virtue from men’s hearts, the proper function of society relied 
primarily on obedience to authority and the force upon which authority is based.  Pascal 
believed that in order for societies to function, justice and force must be combined, for 
“justice without force is impotent; force without justice is tyrannical.”  But, since “justice 
is open to dispute,” and “force is easily recognizable and indisputable,” it is necessary to 
declare the forceful to be just, and not the other way around.27  “Unable to fortify justice, 
we have justified force, so that finally justice and force are brought together and we have 
peace, which is the sovereign good.”28  This reliance upon force and custom in order to 
provide for social stability was firmly rooted in the belief that man, due to his incapacity 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 143. 
 
25
 Pascal, 192. 
 
26
 Ibid., 220. 
 
27
 Ibid., 130. 
 
28
 Ibid., 131. 
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for true virtue, must rely upon outside forces to curtail the drives of amour-propre and to 
maintain certain standards of behavior that keep innovation, and therefore disharmony, in 
check. 
Following Pascal, but much less strict in tone, fellow Jansenist Pierre Nicole also 
expressed notions of amour-propre in social terms.  Nicole, rather than focusing on 
issues such as force and custom, relied upon the notion of amour-propre éclairé, or 
enlightened self-interest, to explain the workings of human society.29  In contrast to 
Pascal’s vision of authority and force as the sole limiting factors of human 
concupiscence, Nicole envisioned men acting on self-limiting impulses that would accept 
short-term limits on self-interest in exchange for perceived long-term gains.30  Rather 
than allowing amour-propre, lust, and avarice absolute free reign, men who were aware 
of their longer interests would avoid harming others in hope of future social benefits. 
Since men are social creatures that rely on interactions with others and upon the 
opinions of others, “enlightened amour-propre, which knows its own true interests, and 
which tends by reason to the end it proposes for itself,” can result in the same actions as 
true charité, which comes only from God.31   The importance of an individual’s 
reputation, their appearance in the eyes of others, plays a crucial role in limiting the 
effects of amour-propre.32  Nicole asserted that human troubles and miseries come from 
                                                 
29
 Pierre Nicole, Œuvres philosophique et morales, ed. Charles Jordain, (Hildesheim and New York: 
Verlag, 1970), 179. 
 
30
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their “indiscreet stirring of other men’s passions… and justice will make us confess that 
very seldom do people speak ill of us without cause.”33  The trouble was that: 
we learn the art of taming beasts and employing them to the uses of life, 
but never think how men may be made useful to us, or at least to render 
them less troublesome or hinder them from making our lives 
uncomfortable, though men contribute infinitely more to our happiness or 
misery than all the rest of creation together.34 
 
In making themselves beloved to others, to give them no offense, men would indeed be 
acting in their own interest, though their actions would give the impression of 
benevolence or charity.35  Therefore, the focus in Nicole’s work was still upon the 
absorption in the self, but in Nicole’s view, society could benefit by the active self-
seeking of each member so long as each knew to avoid short-term gain if it led to long-
term harm.   
 It is plain to see that the Jansenist thinkers of the late 17th century all followed, to 
one degree or another, an attitude towards vice and virtue that seem to presage the 
unabashedly secular philosophy of Bernard Mandeville.36  The crucial difference, of 
course, was that Mandeville would promote self-interest as a positive thing for a modern, 
commercial state; while Pascal, especially, viewed self-interest as a necessary evil at best, 
in the absence of God’s grace.  The utter corruption of man left him incapable, without 
the aid of God’s efficacious Grace, of acting out of any impulse other than amour-propre.  
Therefore, the only means of assuring the function of societies was to render vice and 
                                                 
33
 Ibid., 209. 
 
34
 Nicole, 210.  
 
35
 Ibid., 209. 
 
36
 For more on Bernard Mandeville, see E. J. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville 
and the Discovery of Society, (Cambridge, England: The Cambridge University Press, 1994).  Mandeville’s 
primary contention was that in a modern commercial society, the individual pursuit of private interests 
would result in economic and social benefits to society as a whole. 
19 
 
self-interest useful, and to restrain it through the use of forceful political power.37  Even 
Nicole, with his much softer conception of l’amour propre éclairé, relied upon the notion 
that men act only in what they perceive to be their true selfish interests as a restraint to 
anarchy.38  Thus, the social implication of the concupiscence of man for these Jansenists 
remained the acceptance of, and the need for external restraint upon, the absolutely 
unavoidable depravity and self-interest of every member of society, save, of course, for 
the elect. 
These writings, with their emphasis on the need for external constraints on 
behavior, also reflected many of the prevalent attitudes of the early decades of the Sun 
King’s reign.  As Nannerl Keohane argues, the series of rebellions and civil wars 
collectively called the Fronde fostered a reactionary tendency toward order, and not only 
in the young monarch himself.39  “Frenchmen,” she claims, “worn out by the latest round 
of civil war, were convinced that there was no satisfactory alternative to absolute 
monarchical rule in France.”40  Convinced of the dangers of corporate selfishness, the 
French people threw themselves behind their king and the conviction that the answer to 
France’s problems was the authority and force of rule under their monarch.  That Pascal’s 
answer to the problem of concupiscence involved obedience to authority and restraints 
upon selfish interests can come as no surprise in this environment.   
However, by the last decades of Louis XIV’s rule, the fondness for absolutism 
had waned under the Sun King’s expensive wars, extravagant court, and religious 
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intolerance.  Keohane, Lionel Rothkrug, Joseph Klaits, and others have marked the Edict 
of Fontainebleau, which revoked the Edict of Nantes, as a pivotal moment in French 
history in its revival of opposition to absolutist rule.41  This attempt to finally stamp out 
Protestantism in France preceded the Unigenitus bull by nearly three decades, and had the 
very same intent and unintended consequences.  In each case, Louis XIV hoped to 
eliminate dissent by fostering religious orthodoxy and conformity, and each time created 
greater resentment and intensified the feeling that the king was doing harm to the state by 
persecuting good Frenchmen.42  Keohane refers to the last decades of Louis XIV’s reign 
as “the same watershed” as the Fronde, “crossed in the opposite direction.”43  Therefore, 
by the time Rollin began his writing, decades after Fontainebleau and mere years after 
Unigenitus, absolutist notions were under reexamination.  The route of absolute devotion 
to the king and blind obedience to authority had been tried, and found lacking.  Even the 
king, so removed from and above the rest of society as to be beyond selfish pursuits, had 
shown an inability to put the interests of the state above his own.  The Sun King’s 
ambitions, both at home and abroad, had proved to be a detriment.
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CHAPTER IV 
ROLLIN’S SYNTHESIS 
 
Rollin, while no less Augustinian in his beliefs than Pascal and Nicole, addressed 
the social implications of concupiscence in an entirely, almost radically, different 
manner.  Though he did not use the term often in his writings, Rollin was clearly 
horrified at the way various manifestations of amour-propre had corrupted French 
society from top to bottom.  Rollin termed the shocking acceptance of vice, the thirst for 
wealth and acclaim, and the focus on self-interest throughout French society as “the 
contagion of the age” which needed to be remedied rather than merely accepted.44  “Our 
age, and our nation in particular, stand in need of being undeceived concerning a great 
number of mistakes and false prejudices, which daily prevail more and more upon… 
almost everything that is made the object of the contempt or admiration of mankind.”45    
As for the idea that vice could produce positive results for society, Rollin refuted 
it outright.  Citing certain unidentified ancient writers, Rollin branded the notion that the 
vice of ambition could frequently lead to acts of virtue as a “bizarre contradiction” which 
served only “to nourish and increase the disease.”46  For Rollin, therefore, a reliance on 
the “positive effects” even of amour-propre éclairé to promote the right function and 
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common good of society was a contradiction in terms.  Selfish human ambition was the 
problem, and not the solution, and therefore Rollin refuted the entire edifice constructed 
by Pascal and Nicole to explain the viability of society. 
 In Jansenism’s Augustinian theology, however, no middle ground existed 
between the efficacious Grace of God and utter corruption.  If man can do nothing on his 
own that is truly good or virtuous, how then can the gap between man and virtue be 
bridged save through Grace?  Furthermore, if self-interest cannot account for acts of 
virtue, how else can concupiscent man attain such a state?  Rollin’s solution involved a 
return to the ancient pre-Christian republics and their conceptions of civic-minded virtue 
and devotion to the patrie.  His historical perspective enabled him to see, in the distant 
past, societies that thrived on civic virtues and a love of the patrie, a love sufficient to 
compel men to act in the best interest of the state rather than out of personal inclination or 
interest.  Most importantly, however, was the fact that these societies predated Christ, and 
therefore had no access at all to the “efficacious Grace” sufficient for salvation.  Despite 
this handicap, the Greeks and Romans lived in societies where civic virtue and the 
devotion to interests outside the narrow self were considered to be the rule.  This 
obviously implied that even the “utterly corrupt” non-elect could gain access to a sort of 
virtue that could at least enable men to better function as a society than did France in the 
early 18th century. 
It is essential to avoid here too strong a focus on historical accuracy within 
Rollin’s accounts.  Rollin’s histories of, and attitudes toward, the ancients were definitely 
oversimplified.  The fact is that most of Rollin’s sources of Roman history, for example, 
were accounts of the Republic written during the Empire, and therefore usually written 
23 
 
with a certain nostalgia and reverence for the principles and virtues of a lost polity.  This 
was true, as Linton correctly points out, of nearly all of the sources from the ancient 
world available during this period.47  It is not even necessarily pertinent whether Rollin 
understood these histories to be oversimplified and biased or not.  What is important is 
that these oversimplified accounts based on oversimplified ancient sources enabled Rollin 
to find an escape from the Augustinian trap that neither compromised his religious ideals 
nor allowed amour-propre to remain the guiding light for the bulk of humanity. 
Rollin’s fondness for the virtue of the ancients in no way compromised his 
devotion to Augustinian principles.  Throughout his writings, he drew a distinction 
between right manners and civic virtue on the one hand, and true Christian faith and 
Grace on the other.  In the third volume of his Treatise on Education, Rollin, quoting 
Augustine, clearly made the distinction between these two states:  “without true piety, 
that is, without knowledge and love of the true God, there can be no real virtue… [but] 
these [civic] virtues, though false and imperfect, do still enable those who have them to 
render greater service to the public than if they did not have them.”48  It was therefore 
“false virtues” that Rollin attributes to the ancient Pagans, but virtues still that enabled 
the ancients to act in the interest of the public good, rather than out of self-interest.  In 
describing these virtues in the manner in which he did, Rollin was not undermining the 
preeminence of Christianity, but proposing a set of ideals of immense social utility at a 
time when “mistakes and false prejudices” dominated the social fabric. 
For Rollin, therefore, the proper means to restore virtue to his society, to rescue 
France from the “contagion of the present age,” was to present the history and the 
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virtuous actions of the Ancients as models of behavior to the youth of the nation.49  Due 
to man’s natural disposition toward ill, Rollin felt it necessary to take every care to instill 
in youth the “love of virtue and the detestation of vice,” to guard against “all the deluding 
enchantments” and “confused cries of dangerous opinions” to be heard in every place and 
in every home.50  
Rollin succinctly set out his opinions on the ideals of human behavior in a section 
of his Treatise on Education entitled “On the Taste for Solid Glory and True Greatness.”  
In this section, he addressed the many “bad examples and vicious customs” that 
permeated his society and provided his views on what people should hold as valuable.51  
Most emphatically, Rollin decried the love of wealth in all its forms, of sumptuous 
dwellings, fancy dress, indeed of luxuries of every description. Based on their material 
possessions, men consider themselves to be great, and “flatter themselves that they 
appear so in the eyes of others.”52  But “nothing of all of this,” Rollin wrote, “makes a 
man greater or more estimable, for none of it is truly part of his being, but is external and 
entirely foreign to him.”53  Strip men of their riches, and this illusion would vanish:  
“their outside is rich and fine, like the walls of their apartments; but inside there is 
nothing but pettiness, baseness, poverty, a frightful absence of all merit; and sometimes 
this fine exterior conceals the greatest of crimes and the most shameful disorders.”54   
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According to Rollin, the true value of a man resided not in external things, but in 
his heart, the source of all “great designs, great actions, and great virtues.”55   “Solid 
greatness,” he writes, “which cannot be imitated by pride, nor equaled by pomp, resides 
in the source of personal qualities and noble feelings.”56  So the external trappings of man 
were of utterly no avail, and much of the “contagion of the present age” consisted of the 
focus on possessions, wealth, the illusion of reputation, and other “vicious customs” 
through which men sought their own satisfaction.  In other words, a preoccupation with 
the self, and the undeserved high opinion of others, which men sought out based on their 
exterior being, their titles, their wealth, or reputation.  Nicole made the same contentions, 
but postulated no human solution. 
As Jay Smith has noted, Rollin’s “admiration for the classical republics came 
close to incorporating elements of republicanism itself.”57  While Rollin lauded various 
aspects of several ancient societies (the education of Cyrus in Persia, the laws of 
Lycurgus in Sparta), his greatest praise seems always to fall upon the Romans of the 
ancient Republic.  In fact, Rollin found habits and customs worthy of emulation in nearly 
every aspect of Roman life under the Republic, and even into the Empire.  However, one 
common theme continuously arises, in many different forms: the Romans turned their 
thoughts rigorously away from the fetters of narrow self-interest.  This turn from narrow 
self-interest to consider wider concerns resembles Nicole’s concept of amour-propre 
éclairé, but with an important distinction:  for Rollin, the necessary requirement was an 
alternative locus of devotion.  There were two main foci to which the Romans were 
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utterly devoted, and which enabled them to subsume their interests into a greater whole:  
their gods and their state. 
Paramount to all other facets of the Roman character, Rollin cited the intense 
piété of the Roman people, especially under the Republic.  This, at first glance, seems an 
odd characteristic for a Christian, especially an Augustinian Christian, to praise in a 
pagan people.  However, the principle of pagan piété played an important role in all that 
follows in Rollin’s histories.  “The Romans…,” writes Rollin, “established as a 
fundamental principle of their polity the fear of the Gods, and a veneration for religion.”58  
In this veneration, Rollin remarks that the Romans “were mistaken in the object, but 
reasoned justly as to the substance.”59  Despite the fact that the Roman people 
worshipped gods that were not the One True God, the very fact that they devoutly 
believed and acted upon their beliefs served a distinct social purpose for the polity of the 
Republic. 
Convinced that the Deity disposes every thing in the government of the 
world, and endow men, according to his good pleasure, with 
understanding, reason, prudence, fortitude, [and] courage… it was fitting 
they should implore the celestial power from which all these blessings 
flow, and endeavor by religious consultations to discover the divine will in 
order to merit its protection.60 
 
The Romans, therefore, though deprived of the knowledge of the true God, acted upon 
principles that Rollin admired; they sought guidance and direction from the divine 
presence and depended upon the divine for certain virtues.   
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 Another important facet of Roman life to Rollin was the extent to which the 
religion of the Romans permeated their lives and habits.  Rollin lauded the contributions 
of the Roman king Numa, who purportedly established the pervasive nature of the Roman 
religion.  Numa “set down all its exercises and rites, added the utmost solemnity to its 
ceremonies, and made the festivals as agreeable and attractive as possible.”61  The 
consequence of the Roman focus on the Gods was quite evident to Rollin: 
This habit of introducing religion into all their actions, influenced the 
people with so profound and constant a veneration for the Divinity, that 
from that time… they never created magistrates, declared war, gave battle, 
undertook anything in public or in private, made no marriages, funerals, or 
journeys, without some act of religion.62  
 
A Roman who had sworn an oath, furthermore, “kept it inviolably, without standing in 
need of any security, witnesses, or written contracts; whereas all these precautions were 
ineffectual among the Greeks.”63   
 Having established the importance of religion among the pagan Romans, Rollin 
cited proper education as the means by which the Romans were able to maintain the 
importance of the Divine in their affairs.  It was incredible, he wrote, that so strong an 
impression was made on the Roman people of “the conviction of an omnipresent and 
omniscient Deity, deeply engraved on the tender minds of children, by education, by 
instruction, by the discourses of parents, and especially by the sight of public 
ceremonies.”64  This constant reinforcement of religious ideas, especially in the formative 
years, would play a very prominent role in Rollin’s thought and writings, for constant 
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repetition and the protection of youth from bad examples would become the core of 
Rollin’s ideas for the rejuvenation of the youth of France.  The possibility does exist that 
Rollin couched his admiration for the Romans in terms of piété to placate fellow 
Jansenists unlikely to accept human virtue, though this seems somewhat out of character.  
For Rollin frequently praises ancient cultures for their ability to see beyond the narrow 
interests of the self, regardless of the object of devotion. 
It was not only in their religious duties that Rollin lauds the Romans, for in their 
devotion to the health and glory of the patrie, the Romans again showed a marked tendency 
to subsume their own interests into the common good.  Rollin presents the Roman people 
as exemplary of the sense of devotion to the bien publique.  “Love for the place of their 
birth is natural to all men,” writes Rollin, but this sentiment seems to have been more 
strong and lively in the Romans than in any other nation.65  The Roman people “were 
always ready to encounter all hazards and sufferings” for the sake of the patrie, for “every 
particular person had… a personal interest in the prosperity of the state.”  Such was their 
devotion to the patrie, that the Romans “felt themselves obliged to sacrifice all to it:  their 
fortunes, lives, peace, glory itself, friends, parents, or children.”66 
Just as with the reverence for religion, Rollin credits the education of the Romans 
for their intense and long-standing devotion to their patrie.  Among the Romans: 
No ill treatment could stifle in their heart this love [of the patrie], 
imprinted by nature from their birth, and strongly riveted by education.  It 
was inculcated in them from their very infancy, that a son ought never to 
cancel his duty to his mother, though he should be forgetful of the 
sentiments of nature; nor a citizen be unmindful of his country, though it 
                                                 
65
 Ibid., 1:25. 
 
66
 Ibid.  
29 
 
treat him ever so ungratefully and unjustly.  Of what did such a principle 
not render them capable!67 
 
Rollin saw the Roman people as so intensely devoted to the patrie that not even the 
sharpest attacks of the state upon the individual could blunt this devotion; and that this 
devotion derived not merely from some inborn trait or a “natural” love for the place of 
one’s birth.  These are traits which are, and must be, “riveted,” “inculcated,” burned into 
the mind of the citizen “from infancy” in order to be effective.  One could almost say that 
the love of the patrie and the civic virtues that sprang from this love needed to be 
indoctrinated into the youth of Rome. 
Here we find the greatest departure from the previous Jansenist thinkers in 
Rollin’s work.  In the absence of God’s efficacious grace and in the rejection of self-
interest as society’s glue, the love of the patrie, carefully and constantly reinforced, could 
inspire virtues which, though “false,” make a man useful to his society.    This love for 
the patrie can be seen as a step beyond Pascal’s contention that man can only love that 
which is himself—though in Rollin’s case it is the patrie serving as the focus of devotion, 
a possibility open to all, not merely the elect.  Through the examples of the ancient 
republics, Rollin identifies the patrie as an alternate higher order in which men have 
found, and can find, a greater good, the bien publique, to which they can devote 
themselves. 
A further departure from earlier Jansenists, and another consequence of the 
historicism of Rollin’s ideas, was the refutation of Pascal’s insistence upon the 
paramount importance of authority and, especially, custom.  For Pascal, custom provided 
universally agreed-upon practices that gave stability to a society.  A society’s established 
                                                 
67Rollin, L’histoire Romaine, 1:26. 
30 
 
customs should be followed, not based on their soundness, but “because they are unique, 
and root out disagreement.”68  The sensibility or the practicality of custom did not matter 
at all; rather the simple fact of universal agreement provided the value of custom.  Pascal 
used as an example the matter of succession to the French throne.  The choice of the 
“eldest son of a queen to rule a state” was truly unreasonable to Pascal, but the fact that it 
was an indisputable characteristic made it a wise one.69  Were the choice of ruler 
determined by a disputable claim, such as the wisest or most virtuous, there would be 
cause for dissension and strife, for many would lay claim to the requisite wisdom and 
virtue.  Custom, therefore, and the claim that can be followed without dispute, formed the 
ideal model.  It does not matter if the choice is a good one, provided that civil disturbance 
was avoided.  Authority and custom were the keys to lasting peace. 
As Keohane remarks, Pascal’s position on custom “makes sense only if one is 
convinced that a better way cannot be found—that the whole notion of a ‘better way’ has 
no meaning in this context.’”70  For Pascal, since custom and force were required to 
control the depravity of men, the disruption resulting from the assumption of new 
customs could produce no real benefit; in fact the only true consequence would be the 
instability involved in change itself.71  When force and self-interest are the only 
motivating factors in men’s lives, the particulars of the custom in question are almost 
immaterial.  For Rollin, however, the corrupted, vice-ridden customs of his age 
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demanded change, and his intimate familiarity with the civic virtue of the ancients 
provided the vehicle through which new customs could take root. 
That Rollin denied the usefulness of custom is easily understood, of course, from 
the context in which he was writing.  The current state of affairs did not represent a 
source of beneficial stability and order for Rollin, as it did for Pascal.  Pascal lived and 
wrote during the high point of absolutism in France.  As Keohane points out, the strong 
reign of Louis XIV, compared to the uncertainty and the instability of the Fronde, 
demonstrated the positive effects of strong authority.72  Obedience to authority, rigid 
social structure, and adherence to accepted norms all were perceived as beneficial to 
society.  On the contrary, for Rollin, the customs and accepted social norms of his age 
were the problem that needed to be addressed and remedied.  By the time Rollin had 
begun his writings, the absolutism of the Sun King, and especially the manner in which 
Louis XIV had used his power, had led Rollin and others to question the values of their 
society.  Furthermore, the thirst for titles and offices on the part of many non-nobles, and 
the jealous insistence on the maintenance of privileges on the part of those that were 
ennobled, indicated to Rollin a society that valued little other than personal gain and 
aggrandizement. 
For the youth “look upon as valuable that which they see everybody value; and 
are guided, not by reason, but by custom.”73  This is not to say that custom served no 
utility for Rollin, but that unexamined custom poses great dangers, especially in terms of 
the education of youth: 
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Though it is ordinarily a wise and judicious course to avoid all singularity 
and to follow the received customs, I wonder whether in the matter we 
treat if this principle does not admit of some exception, and whether we 
should not apprehend the dangers and inconveniences of blindly following 
the footsteps of those who have preceded us, so as to consult custom more 
than reason, and rule our actions by what others do rather than what they 
should do… an error once established is handed down from age to age, 
and becomes almost an immutable law, because we believe we should act 
like the rest of mankind.74 
 
Of course, this would not be a problem if the majority of men always made the best 
choices, but “human nature is not so happy that the greatest number chooses the best 
course.”75  Therefore, the path to follow in order to determine and to learn right living 
was not through custom, nor through a simple reliance upon the word of God in 
scriptures, but through right reason and the ability and responsibility to determine what is 
right.  What was important in this system, however, were wise and judicious masters, 
presumably like Rollin himself, to guide the student in the proper use of reason in the 
light of examples of virtuous behavior found in antiquity.
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CHAPTER V 
ROLLIN AND FRENCH SOCIETY 
 
Rollin’s response to the “contagion of the age” was a renewed emphasis on 
virtuous education on the model of the ancient republics.  Furthermore, unlike previous 
works that discussed virtuous education, like Fénelon’s Télémaque, Bossuet’s Lettres sur 
l’éducation du Dauphin, or even fellow Jansenist Duguet’s Institution d’un Prince, 
Rollin’s proposals for the education in virtue were intended not for sovereigns and their 
heirs, but for the general youth of the state.  In fact, Télémaque, despite its huge 
popularity, was not even published with the author’s permission—Fénelon had composed 
it solely for the education of the Duc de Bourgogne.  Contrast this with Rollin, who 
excused himself for the wealth of examples in the Treatise on Education by reminding the 
reader that “this work is not designed for the learned… but that my design is principally 
to instruct young students, who will often have scarce any other notion of history than 
what I shall give them in this book.”76  And this instruction, furthermore, was designed to 
demonstrate the value of virtuous living through the examples of antiquity.77  In other 
                                                 
76
 Rollin, Traité des études, 1:167. 
 
77
 Ibid., 1:8-9. 
34 
 
words, Rollin’s work was a direct reflection of the idea that virtue belonged not just to 
kings, but to all members of the state, or at least all who acquire an education.78 
In presenting his conceptions of society in these terms of classical republican, 
civic-minded virtue, Rollin called into question the practices of many institutions, though 
not necessarily the institutions themselves, that composed the French state.  Though 
Rollin did not display any real distaste for the nobility as an institution, he certainly felt 
strongly that the attitudes of some nobles did not serve to better the state.79  Hereditary 
titles of nobility (la noblesse d’extraction), for Rollin, were society’s way of showing 
gratitude for services rendered that could not be fully repaid during the lifetime of the 
benefactor.80  However, these honors were not an end in themselves, nor were they 
simply to benefit the future bearers of these titles, for: 
the public interest demands that we must pay this tribute of honor and 
consideration to their descendants, as it is an engagement to them to 
support and perpetuate in their family the reputation of their ancestors, by 
perpetuating as well the same virtues which made their ancestors so 
illustrious.81 
 
The institution of nobility served a public utility in conferring honor upon the 
descendants of great men, while simultaneously bestowing an obligation to continue to 
serve the state in the manner of their forebears. 
 However, in the absence of continued service, or in the expectation of special 
treatment and consideration based on ancient title, nobility of birth became hollow.  
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When this homage is “claimed as a debt, or demanded by force, the right to it is lost, and 
it changes into hatred and contempt.”82  The pride of those who feel that “all is owed 
them due to their birth and look down upon the rest of mankind from their high station” 
cannot help but inspire the contempt of all around them.83  There is nothing to gain in 
such a situation, nor any benefit to the state to be found.  An illustrious ancestor does not 
make a man worthy of respect:   
Nobles have been seen to dishonor their name by low and wretched vices, 
while commoners have ennobled and gained renown for their family by 
their great qualities.  It is right to maintain the glory of one’s ancestors by 
actions… but it is also glorious to leave to one’s descendents a title which 
is not borrowed from ancestors to become the chief and author of one’s 
own nobility.84 
 
For nobility and the honors it confers is not the end in itself, but simply the means by 
which society repays its own, and therefore “the only source of true nobility... is merit 
and virtue.”85  In this context, obviously, virtue can only be that which is of benefit to the 
patrie, rather than the individual. 
 Rollin’s views on nobility strike a surprisingly egalitarian tone.  Certainly, the 
courtier seeking favors from the king does not fit well with Rollin’s conceptions of the 
“nobility of merit and virtue.”  In fact, the value of the social hierarchy itself loses 
importance when all honors paid to the nobility are considered strictly voluntary.  This 
begs the question of whether Rollin actually believed that the entire social hierarchy of 
the monarchy needed to be done away with or altered.  Certainly many of his later 
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readers may have agreed.  But many of his readers were also nobles and, as Smith points 
out, a number of nobles adopted many of Rollin’s ideas on education.86   
 A final aspect of Rollin’s views on education further underscores the extent to 
which the principles of the ancient republics informed his thinking, as well as the extent 
to which his ideals presaged the revolutionary generation, for Rollin’s ideals reflected the 
idea that children belonged less to their parents than to the state.  Though he equivocates 
somewhat over whether public or private education were preferable, on the basis of his 
often-repeated examples it is quite clear that Rollin himself would chose public education 
modeled on the ancient republics.   
 Rollin lauded the ancient forms of public education for many reasons, most 
importantly demonstrating the utility to the state and the effectiveness of instilling the 
virtues of courage, honesty, and merit in the student.  The ancients, Rollin wrote, 
believed:  
that children are more the property of the republic than their parents; and 
that  therefore their education should not be given up to their fancies, but 
be entrusted to the care of the republic; that for this reason children ought 
to be brought up, not in private in their fathers’ houses, but in public, by 
common masters and under the same discipline, that they may be early 
inspired with a love of their patrie, respect for the laws of their country, 
and relish for the principles and maxims of the state in which they live.87 
 
Thus, the importance of service to the state extended back to childhood, where the desire 
to love and serve the patrie would be instilled.  This important theme would, of course, 
inform all of Rollin’s writings on education.  Furthermore, as Smith points out, the theme 
of “children belonging to the patrie” would grow in prominence both in political and 
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pedagogical thought through the remainder of the century.88  However, it is important to 
note that, while the terms of virtuous education would become progressively secularized, 
Rollin’s emphasis on educating students outside the home also served the purpose of 
instructing students in the precepts of the Christian faith.89 
 In a very great measure, part of protecting children from the “contagion of the 
age” involved protecting children from the failings of their own parents.  Quoting 
Quintillian, Rollin echoes the idea that when children learn bad habits: 
The evil usually springs from the parents themselves, by the bad examples 
they set before their children.  In their own homes, they hear and see such 
things that they ought to be ignorant of their whole lives.  All this passes 
into habit and soon after into nature.  The poor children find themselves 
vicious before they know what vice is.  Thus breathing nothing but luxury 
and pleasure, they do not take their disorder from their schools, but bring 
it to them.90 
 
For Rollin, the public schools provide an atmosphere that fosters the learning of valuable 
virtues suitable to render service to the patrie.   
In these passages we see again the intense pessimism of the Jansenists regarding 
the corruption and corruptibility of the human condition.  Though the notion that children 
can be imprinted with either positive or negative traits is reminiscent of Locke’s tabula 
rasa, in the Augustinian Jansenist view, virtuous traits were very difficult to maintain.91  
Very little in the way of bad examples was required to deflect youth from the right 
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education that Rollin deemed necessary for the development of good morals and good 
citizenship.  Parents generally could not be trusted with the moral health of their own 
children, and a single bad example was sufficient to instill students with the love of vice 
against which the virtuous education was posed.  This pessimism provided the root for 
Rollin’s belief that children were best to be raised from a very young age by masters of 
worth, and therefore emphasized the idea, later echoed by Rousseau, that children 
belonged more to the state than to their parents.
   
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 The writings of Charles Rollin make clear that religious thought and Christian 
systems of belief did indeed have positive influence on the revival of classical republican 
civic virtue in France.  It is clear that several important notions about civic virtues and the 
manner of instilling these virtues in society developed not only in the works of men such 
as Montesquieu and Rousseau, but also through the thought of this devoutly religious 
educator of young minds.  In fact, Rousseau and Montesquieu would both later revisit 
themes contained in Rollin’s work, albeit in slightly altered form. 
 First of all, Rousseau’s ideas on pedagogy and the construction of a polity echo 
some of Rollin’s conceptions both in terms of civic virtue and in terms of fostering a 
focus for devotion outside the individual.  Rousseau’s emphasis on the importance of 
ritual and ceremony in fostering a love for the patrie is unmistakably present in Rollin’s 
writings; in fact their ideas emerge from the same source—Numa.  Rousseau would echo 
many of Rollin’s sentiments on the importance of the second Roman king, as Bell points 
out in Cult of the Nation.  For example, Rousseau credits Numa, rather than Romulus, as 
the true founder of the Roman state.92  According to Rousseau, Numa made the Romans 
into citizens “by gentle instruction which attached them to each other, and to their land, 
by making their city sacred to them through these apparently frivolous and superstitious 
rites” [italics mine].  Rousseau stressed the importance of public festivals and ceremonies 
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in fostering a love of the patrie, basically in imitation of Numa’s ideas, but denies the 
importance of the rituals in and of themselves.  While Rollin credited Numa with 
founding the Roman religion upon which their virtues were grounded, Rousseau 
emphasized his importance in creating the rites through which the unity of the Roman 
state was grounded.  Again, the difference between the two is the emphasis and 
importance of religion in their respective views. 
Bell therefore uses these passages to again demonstrate the idea that nationhood 
developed “out of and against a religious system of belief.”93  However, it is quite 
apparent that the ideas of Numa were recognized in France decades before Rousseau 
cynically dismissed the religious ideas of Numa as a social tool.  In other words, Rollin 
and Rousseau understood Numa differently; and that for Rollin, the religious elements of 
Numa’s actions were no less important than the social elements.  For Rollin, the religious 
and the civic aspects of the Roman world were both important, and the “frivolous and 
superstitious” rites played an important role in the development of virtue, not merely in 
the foundation of the state. 
Montesquieu would also revisit an important theme of Rollin’s work, the 
distinction between Christian and political virtue.  For Rollin, the civic virtue of the 
ancients represented a “false virtue” which could allow men to act in the interests of their 
society—to be virtuous—despite the inability of the non-elect to receive the efficacious 
Grace of God from which all true virtue flowed.  Montesquieu, in his 1757 revision of De 
l’esprit des lois, would make the same distinction in reverse.  Montesquieu had claimed 
in his original version of the work that the vertu of the ancients was unobtainable by 
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modern men.  In the revision he makes clear that he was speaking only of political virtue, 
and not religious virtue: 
That which I call virtue in a republic is the love of the patrie, that is to say, 
the love of equality.  This is not a moral virtue, nor is it a Christian 
virtue—it is political virtue; it is the energy which moves republican 
government, just as honor is the energy which moves a monarchy.94 
 
This distinction, which Montesquieu emphasized to placate religious-minded readers, 
was the same distinction Rollin used to provide an avenue through which a concupiscent 
society could regenerate itself through the application of republican forms of civic virtue. 
Another marked similarity between Montesquieu and Rollin was their ambiguity.  
Smith credits Montesquieu’s appeal in large part to the “rich ambiguity” of his work.95  
Rollin, too, produced writings open to a variety of interpretations, a fact which helps 
explain his appeal not only within the French educational system, but also within the 
salon culture, as well as in England and among the founders of the American republic.  
Though much of his writings emphasized the virtues of ancient republics, Rollin stressed 
his preference for the monarchical form of government.  Though he made strong 
arguments for the benefits of public education, he underscored his aversion to expressing 
a preference for others to follow.96  Though he stressed a degree of egalitarianism and the 
“voluntary” expression of deference to nobles and a nobility based on merit, he made no 
outright statements against the institution of the nobility itself.  Despite his own intense 
piety and devotion to Augustinian religious principles, he expressed no sentiments that 
fell outside of the mainstream of Christian thought.   
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In spite of these ambiguities, on several counts Rollin made his beliefs abundantly 
clear.  France was in need of a regenerative force, something to free her from the 
“contagion of the age,” and he found this force in a return to the civic virtues of the 
ancients.  The proper method of instilling these virtues was through rigorous education, 
which would instill in the youth of France a love of the patrie and an intense devotion to 
“solid glory and true greatness” which would provide maximum benefit to the French 
state.  All of these ideas played a significant role in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, even into the Revolution, and did not originate in “opposition to Christian 
systems of belief,” but through the writings of an intensely devout Christian educator. 
Among his contemporaries, Rollin was admired for “his generous and exalted 
sentiments, his zeal for everything that regards the good of human society, his love of 
virtue, [and] his reverence for Divine Providence.”97  In a preface to Rollin’s compiled 
works, published in 1821, Saint-Albin Berville wrote: 
Rollin’s true aim in the instruction of history is the love of religion, and it 
is by philosophy that he wants to lead us to it; for to him true religion is 
the sister of true philosophy.  Rollin does not want to base the reign of 
faith on the ruins of reason; he despises both the superstition which 
degrades it, and the fanaticism which dishonors it.  Christianity is in his 
eyes the perfection of morals, and, when he evokes the virtues of 
paganism, it is not to insult, but to instruct the Christian whose duty is to 
exceed these virtues.98 
 
From these expressions, it is evident that Rollin was recognized specifically for his piety 
and commitment to religious values. 
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 However, Rollin’s combination of deep religious piety and admiration for 
classical republican ideals of civic virtue and devotion to the patrie place him outside the 
expected norms of eighteenth century thought.  Perhaps it is the anticipation of a secular, 
or at least, secularized, development of civic virtue, informed by the expectation of the 
Revolution on the historical horizon, that has caused his writings to be largely overlooked 
by the historical record.  Even David Bell, whose work is in large measure devoted to the 
Christian roots of a secularized virtue, mentions Rollin only in a list of sculptures 
commissioned for salons by the Marquis D’Angiviller.99  Rollin’s writings do not appear 
in any of Bell’s work.  Dale Van Kley, noted scholar of Jansenism, devotes only a single 
sentence to Rollin in The Religious Origins of the French Revolution, the only work in 
which Van Kley mentions him.  In other words, Rollin, despite his remarkable synthesis 
of Augustinian theology, classical republican virtue, social utility, and pedagogical 
foresight, remains largely absent from the historiography of his time. 
 This is unfortunate, for in Rollin’s work, we find not only a remarkable synthesis 
of Christian piety and classical republican virtue, but also the antecedents of the giants of 
the age, such as Montesquieu and Rousseau.  The clear interconnections between 
religious beliefs and the revival of conceptions of civic virtue are clear throughout 
Rollin’s writings.  Finally, Rollin’s work accentuates the intense ambiguities of his age.  
The eighteenth century was a time when a devout Jansenist educator could write 
educational treatises filled with ideas of great political consequence for future decades.  
Rollin’s writings on classical virtue were of such richness and depth, intensity and 
ambiguity, that both commoner and nobleman, monarchist and republican, Frenchman 
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and American, could look upon them in a favorable light and find value and insight in 
their pages.
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